BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. ]23 added other items not less important, but which did not admit of being weighed and numbered ; the unrivalled maritime skill and discipline of the seamen, the democratical sentiment, alike fervent and unanimous, of the general mass of citizens, and the superior development of directing intelligence. And when we consider that the enemy had indeed on his side an irresistible land-force, but scarcely anything else, few ships, no trained seamen, no funds, no powers of combination or headship, we may be satisfied that there were ample materials for an orator like Perikles to draw an encouraging picture of the future. He could depict Athens as holding Peloponnesus under siege by means of her navy and a chain of insular posts j 1 and he could guarantee success 2 as the sure reward of persevering, orderly, &nd well-considered exertion, combined with firm endurance under a period of temporary but unavoidable suffering ; and combined too with another condition hardly less difficult for Athenian temper to comply with, abstinence from seductive speculations of distant enterprise, while their force was required by the necessities of war near home. 3 But such prospects were founded upon a long-sighted calculation, looking beyond immedi- ate loss, and therefore likely to take less hold of the mind of an ordinary citizen, or at any rate, to be overwhelmed for the moment by the pressure of actual hardship. Moreover, the best which Perikles could promise was a successful resistance, the unimpaired maintenance of that great empire to which Athens had become accustomed ; a policy purely conservative, without any stimulus from the hope of positive acquisition, and not only without the sympathy of other states, but with feelings of simple acquiescence on the part of most of her allies, of strong hostility everywhere else. On all these latter points the position of the Peloponnesian alliance was far more encouraging. So powerful a body of con- 1 Thucyd. ii, 7. ? (3ej3aiuc vrcptf TTJV HehoKovvrjaov vi, 90. wepif TTJV HeXoTTOvvrjaov KohiopKovvTEf, 2 Thucyd. ii, 65. TOOOVTOV Tip HepiKhel enepiffcfevae TOTE dd' uv , KOI TTUVV uv f>g.6luf Trcpiycvea&ai TUV H&oirovvTjatuv avTuv
3 Thucyd. i, 144. TJV E&e?t.j]Te apxqv re firjEiriKTuadai.uua 7ro?.s//otivref,
