178 fflSTORY OF GREECE. empire of Athens. This is of course founded on the destructive invasions of the country during the Peloponnesian war ; for down to the commencement of that war the position of Attic cultivators and proprietors was particularly enviable : and the censure of M. Boeckh, therefore, depends upon the question, how far Perikles contributed to produce, or had it in his power to avert, this melancholy war, in its results so fatal, not merely to Athens, but to the entire Grecian race. Now here again, if we follow attentively the narrative of Thucydides, we shall see that in the judgment of that historian, not only Perikles did not bring on the war, but he could not have averted it without such conces- sions as Athenian prudence, as well as Athenian patriotism per- emptorily forbade : moreover, we shall see, that the calculations on which Perikles grounded his hopes of success if driven to war, were, in the opinion of the historian, perfectly sound and safe. "We may even go farther, and affirm, that the administra- tion of Perikles during the fourteen years preceding the war, exhibits a " moderation, " to use the words of Thucydides, 1 dic- tated especially by anxiety to avoid raising causes of war ; though in the months immediately preceding the breaking out of the war, after the conduct of the Corinthians at Potidaea, and the resolutions of the congress at Sparta, he resisted strenuously all compliance with special demands from Sparta, demands essen- tially insincere, and in which partial compliance would have lowered the dignity of Athens without insuring peace. The stories about Pheidias, Aspasia, and the Megarians, even if we should grant that there is some truth at the bottom of them, must, if we follow Thucydides. be looked upon at worst as con- comitants and pretexts, rather than as real causes, of the war: though modern authors, in speaking of Perikles. are but too apt to use expressions which tacitly assume these stories to be well founded. Seeing then that Perikles did not bring on and could not have averted the Peloponnesian war, that he steered his course in reference to that event with the long-sighted prudence of one Thucyd ii, 65. fterpiuf t-riyelro . i, 144. dina.? 6e OTI tiovvai KOTU Tuf Zvv&rjKar, irohsftov de OVK (ipo/4v, up%o[ivovc 6s uuvvnfa
uttia.
