&EPARATE CONVENTION OF THE PELOPONNESIANS. 305 Demosthenes was about three hundred : that of the opponents much greater, but the number is not specified. Of the three Spartan commanders, two, Eurylochus and Ma- karius, had been slain : the third, Menedceus, found himself be- leaguered both by sea and land, the Athenian squadron being on guard along the coast. It would seem, indeed, that he might have fought his way to Ambrakia, especially as he would have met the Ambrakiot reinforcement coming from the city. But whether this were possible or not, the commander, too much dis- pirited to attempt it, took advantage of the customary truce granted for burying the dead, to open negotiations with Demos- thenes and the Akarnanian generals, for the purpose of obtaining an unmolested retreat. This was peremptorily refused : but Demosthenes (with the consent of the Akarnanian leaders) secretly intimated to the Spartan commander and those immedi- ately around him, together with the Mantineans and other Pelop- onnesian troops, that if they chose to make a separate and surreptitious retreat, abandoning their comrades, no opposition would be offered : for he designed by this means, not merely to isolate the Ambrakiots, the great enemies of Argos and Akar- nania, along with the body of miscellaneous mercenaries who had come under Eurylochus, but also to obtain the more per- manent advantage of disgracing the Spartans and Peloponne- sians in the eyes of the Epirotic Greeks, as cowards and traitors to military fellowship. The^very reason which prompted De- mosthenes to grant a separate facility of escape, ought to have been imperative with Menedaaus and the Peloponnesians around him, to make them spurn it with indignation : yet such was their anxiety for personal safety, that this disgraceful convention was accepted, ratified, and carried into effect forthwith. It stands alone in Grecian history, as a specimen of separate treason in officers, to purchase safety for themselves by abandoning those under their command. Had the officers been Athenian, it would have been doubtless quoted as an example of the pretended faithlessness of democracy : but as it was the act of a Spartan commander in conjunction with many leading Peloponnesians, we can only remark upon it as a farther manifestation of that intra-Peloponnesian selfishness, and carelessness of obligation
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