plain less if ve made open use of our superior force with regard to them; but we discard such maxims, and deal with them upon
jurisdiction, whereas the latter were compelled to try all their disputes in the courts of Athens." Doubtless this distinction would prevail to a certain degree, but how far it was pushed we can hardly say. Suppose that a dispute took place between Chios and one of the subject islands, or between an individual Chian and an individual Thasian; would not the Chian plaintiff sue, or the Chian defendant be sued, before the Athenian dikastery? Suppose that an Athenian citizen or officer became involved in dispute with a Chian, would not the Athenian dikastery be the competent court, whichever of the two were plaintiff or defendant? Suppose a Chian citizen or magistrate to be suspected of fomenting revolt, would it not be competent to any accuser, either Chian or Athenian, to indict him before the dikastery at Athens? Abuse of power, or peculation, committed by Athenian officers at Chios, must of course be brought before the Athenian dikasteries, just as much as if the crime had been committed at Thasos or Naxos. We have no evidence to help us in regard to these questions; but I incline to believe that the difference in respect to judicial arrangement, between the autonomous and the subject-allies, was less in degree than M. Boeckh believes. We must recollect that the arrangement was not all pure hardship to the allies, the liability to be prosecuted was accompanied with the privilege of prosecuting for injuries received.
There is one remark, however, which appears to me of importance for understanding the testimonies on this subject. The Athenian empire, properly so called, which began by the confederacy of Delos after the Persian invasion, was completely destroyed at the close of the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was conquered and taken. But after some years had elapsed, towards the year 377 B.C., Athens again began to make maritime conquests, to acquire allies, to receive tribute, to assemble a synod, and to resume her footing of something like an imperial city. But her power over her allies, during this second period of empire, was nothing like so great as it had beea during the first, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars: nor can we be at all sure that what is true of the second is also true of the first. Now I think it probable, that those statements of the grammarians, which represent the allies as carrying on δίκας ἀπὸ συμβόλων in ordinary practice with the Athenians, may really be true about the second empire or alliance. Bekker. Anecdota, p. 436. Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ συμβόλων ἐκδίκαζον τοῖς ὑπηκόοις· οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης. Pollux, viii, 63. Ἀπὸ συμβόλων δὲ δίκη ἧν, ὅτε οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐκδικάζοντο. Also Hesychius, i, 489. The statement here ascribed to Aristotle may very probably be true about the second alliance, though it cannot be held true for the first. In the second, the Athenians mar really have had σύμβολα, or special conventions for judicial business, with many of their principal allies, instead of making Athens the authoritative centre, and heir to the Delian synod, as they did during the first. It is to be remarked, however, that Harpokration, in the explanation which he gives of σύμβολα
