ATHENS BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 63 the morning the Korkyraean fleet adrancing towards them, dis- tributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three gen- erals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corin- thians, occupying the left of their aggregate fleet : next came the various allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle ; but the tactics and manoeuvring were not commensurate to the numbers. The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers below, on the Korkyraean side at least, were in great part slaves : the ships, on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct impact, prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each, as if they were on land, or rather, like boarding-parties : all upon the old- fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those im- provements which had been introduced into the Athenian navy during the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers, and the steersman, were of much greater importance than the armed troops on deck : by strength and exactness of rowing, by rapid and sudden change of direction, by feints cal- culated to deceive, the Athenian captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable parts of his enemy, side, oars, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of her crew the real weapon of attack, which was first to disable the enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water ; and not until this was done did the armed troops on deck begin their operations. 1 Lacedaemonius, with his ten armed ships, though forbidden by his instructions to share in the battle, lent as much aid as he could by taking station at the extremity of the line, and by making motions as if about eiv airb VEUV to turn the naval battle into a land-battle on shipboard, was a practice altogether repugnant to Athenian feeling, as we see remarked also in Thucyd. iv, 14: compare also vii, 61. The Corinthian and Syracnsan ships ultimately came to counteract the Athenian manoeuvring by constructing their prows with increased solidity and strength, and forcing the Athenian vessel to a direct shock, which it*
weaker prow was unable to bear (Thucyd. vii, 36).
