J2 IIISTOUY OF GREECE. property, would be found still lingering throughout the neighbor- ing lands, not yet removed within the walls, and might thus be seized for the subsistence of their army ; ' while the deserted town and harbor of Megara, very near to Syracuse both by land and by sea, might be occupied by the fleet as a naval station. The imposing and intimidating effect of the armament, not less than its real efficiency, was now at the maximum, immediately after its arrival. If advantage were taken of this first impression to strike an instant blow at their principal enemy, the Syracusans would be found destitute of the courage, not less than of the means, to resist : but the longer such attack was delayed, the more this first impression of dismay would be effaced, giving place to a reactionary sentiment of indifference and even con- tempt, when the much-dreaded armament was seen to accomplish little or nothing. As for the other Sicilian cities, nothing would contribute so much to determine their immediate adhesion, as successful operations against Syracuse. 2 But Lamachus found na favor with either of the other tw, and being thus compelled to choose between the plans of Alkibi- ades and Nikias, gave his support to that of the former, which was the mean term of the three. There can be no doubt as far as it is becoming to pronounce respecting that which never reached execution that the plan of Lamachus was far the best and most judicious ; at first sight, indeed, the most daring, but intrinsically the safest, easiest, and speediest, that could be sug- gested. For undoubtedly the siege and capture of Syracuse, was the one enterprise indispensable towards the promotion of Athenian views in Sicily. The sooner that was commenced, the more easily it would be accomplished : and its difficulties were in many ways aggravated, in no way abated, by those preliminary precautions upon which Alkibiades insisted. Anything like delay tended fearfully to impair the efficiency, real as well as reputed, of an ancient aggressive armament, and to animate as well as to strengthen those who stood on the defensive, a point DM which we shall find painful evidence presently. The advice of Lamachus, alike soldier-like and far-sighted, would probably ' Compare iv, 104, describing the surprise of Amphipolis by Brasidas
- Thiicyd. vi, 49.
