.MKIAS RETIRES FROM SYRACUSE. 223 in sending to Athens for cavalry and money, as well as in pro- curing the like reinforcements from his Sicilian allies, whose .numbers he calculated now on increasing by the accession of new cities after his recent victory, and to get together magazines of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the spring. Despatching a- trireme to Athens with these requisitions, he sailed with his forces to Messene, within which there was a favorable party who gave hopes of opening the gates to him. Such a correspondence had already been commenced before the departure of Alkibiades : but it was the first act of revenge which the departing general took on his country, to betray the proceedings to the philo-Syracusan party in .Messene. Accord- ingly, these latter, watching their opportunity, rose in arms before the arrival of Nikias, put to death their chief antagonists, and held the town by force against the Athenians ; who after a fruit- less delay of thirteen days, with scanty supplies and under stormy weather, were forced to return to Naxos, where they established a palisaded camp and station, and went into winter quarters. 1 The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement into the harbor of Syracuse, and the battle, had been ably planned and executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army, as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers them- selves, and to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. But as to other results, the victory was barren ; we may even say, pos- itively mischievous, since it imparted a momentary stimulus which served as an excuse to Nikias for the three months of total inaction which followed, and since it neither weakened nor hu- miliated the Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. His apathy during these first eight months after the arrival of thu expedition at Rhegium (from July 415 B.C. to March 414 B.C.), was the most deplorable of all calamities to his army, his country, and himself. Abundant proofs of this will be seen in the coming events : at present, we have only to turn back to his own predic- tions and recommendations. All the difficulties and dangers to
1 Thucyd. vi, 71-74.
