JMPKOVED DEFENCE AT SYRACUSE 227 It there were no complaints raised against Nikias at Athens, so neither are we informed of any such, even among his own sol- diers in Sicily, though their disappointment must have been yet greater than that of their countrymen at home, considering the expectations with which they had come out. We may remember that the delay of a few days at Eion, under perfectly justifiable circumstances, and while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements actually sent for, raised the loudest murmurs against Kleon in his expedition against Amphipolis, from the hoplites in his own army. 1 The contrast is instructive, and will appear yet more instructive as we advance forward. Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of then- recent defeat. In the next public assembly which ensued, Her- mokrates addressed them in the mingled tone of encouragement and admonition. He praised their bravery, while he deprecated their want of tactics and discipline. Considering the great supe- riority of the enemy in this last respect, he regarded the recent battle as giving good promise for the future ; and he appealed with satisfaction to the precautions taken by Nikias in fortifying his camp, as well as to his speedy retreat after the battle. He pressed them to diminish the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto been accustomed to nominate to the command ; to reduce the number to three, conferring upon them at the same It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or inconsistent with the whole tenor of the narrative of Thucydides, than to charge the Atheni- ans with having starved their expedition. What they arc really chargeable with, is, the having devoted to it a disproportionate fraction of their entire strength, perfectly enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydides plainly conceives it, when he is describing both the armament of Nikias and that of Demosthenes. Thucydides is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias, whom he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and tenderness. But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that he conceived the mismanagement of the general as the cause of the failure of the armament, not as " one of two causes," as Dr. Arnold here presents it. Of course, I recognize fully tho consummate skill, and the aggressive vigor so unusual in a Spartan, of Gy lippus, together with the effective influence which this exercised upon tho result. But Gylippus would never have set foot in Syracuse, had he not been let in, first through the apathy, next through the contemptuous want if precaution, shown by Nikias (vii, 42).
Thuryd. v, 7. See volume vi of this History, chap, liv, p. 401.
