28G HISTORY OF GREECE. been now first and undeniably broken by their enemy, so thai they might with a safe conscience recommence the war. 1 Such was the state of feeling between the two great powers of Central Greece in November 414 B.C., when the envoys arrived from Syracuse ; envoys from Nikias on the one part, from Gy- lippus and the Syracusans on the other; each urgently calling for farther support. The Corinthians and Syracusans vehemently pressed their claims at Sparta ; nor was Alkibiades again want- ing, to renew his instances for the occupation of Dekeleia. It was in the face of this impending liability to renewed Pelopon- nesian invasion that the Athenians took their resolution, above commented on, to send a second army to Syracuse and prosecute the siege with vigor. If there were any hesitation yet remaining on the part of the Lacedaemonians, it disappeared so soon as they were made aware of the imprudent resolution of Athens ; which not only created an imperative necessity for sustaining Syracuse, but also rendered Athens so much more vulnerable at home, by removing the better part of her force. Accordingly, very soon after the vote passed at Athens, an equally decisive resolution for direct hostilities was adopted at Sparta. It was determined that a Peloponnesian allied force should be immediately pre- pared, to be sent at the first opening of spring to Syracuse, and that at the same time Attica should be invaded, and the post of Dekeleia fortified. Orders to this effect were immediately transmitted to the whole body of Peloponnesian allies ; especially requisitions for implements, materials, and workmen, towards the construction of the projected fort at Dekeleia. 2
' Thucyd. vi, 105 vii, 1 & a Thucjd ci', 1 S.
