FIGHTS IN THE CHEAT HARBOR. 295 were able to plant others in their room. On the whole, no seri- ous damage was done, either to the dockyard or to the ships within. And the state of affairs in the Great Harbor stood sub- stantially unaltered, during all the time that the envoys were absent on their Sicilian tour, probably three weeks or a month. 1 These envoys had found themselves almost everywhere well received. The prospects of Syracuse were now so triumphant, and those of Nikias with his present force so utterly hopeless, that the waverers thought it time to declare themselves ; and all the Greek cities in Sicily, except Agrigentum, which still re- mained neutral (and of course except Naxos and Katana), resolved on aiding the winning cause. From Kamarina came five hundred hoplites, four hundred darters, and three hundred bowmen ; from Gela, five triremes, four hundred darters, and two hundred horsemen. Besides these, an additional force from the other cities was collected, to march to Syracuse in a body across the interior of the island, under the conduct of the envoys themselves. But this part of the scheme was frustrated by Nikias, who was rendered more vigilant by the present des- perate condition of his affairs, than he had been in reference to the cross march of Gylippus. At his instance, the Sikel tribes Kentoripes and Halikyaei, allies of Athens, were prevailed upon to attack the approaching enemy. They planned a skilful am- buscade, set upon them unawares, and dispersed them with the loss of eight hundred men. All the envoys were also slain, except the Corinthian, who conducted the remaining force, about fifteen hundred in number, to Syracuse. 2 This reverse which seems to have happened about the time when Demosthenes with his armament were at Korkyra, on the way to Syracuse so greatly dismayed and mortified the Syra- cusans, that Gylippus thought it advisable to postpone awhile the attack which he intended to have made immediately on the rein- forcement arriving. 3 The delay of these few days proved nothing less than the salvation of the Athenian army. It was not until Demosthenes was approaching Khegium within two or three days' sail of Syracuse, that the attack was determined on without farther delay. Preparation in every way had been
1 Thucyil. vii, 25. * Thncycl. vii, 32, 33. 3 Thucyd. vii, 33
