CAPTURE OF THE REAR DIVISION. 341 emy, and deprived even of the resources of an active despair, they endured incessant harassing for the greater part of the day, with- out refreshment or repose, and with the number of their wounded continually increasing ; until at length the remaining spirit of the unhappy sufferers was thoroughly broken. Perceiving theii condition, Gylippus sent to them a herald with a proclamation ; inviting all the islanders among them to come forth from the rest, and promising them freedom if they did so. The inhabitants of some cities, yet not many, a fact much to their honor, availed themselves of this offer and surrendered. Presently, however, a larger negotiation was opened, which ended by the entire division capitulating upon terms, and giving up their arms. Gylippus and the Syracusans engaged that the lives of all should be spared ; that is, that none should be put to death either by violence, or by intolerable bonds, or by starvation. Having all been disarmed, they were forthwith conveyed away as prisoners to Syracuse, six thousand in number. It is a remarkable proof of the easy and opulent circumstances of many among these gallant sufferers, when we are told that the money which they had about them, even at this last moment of pressure, was sufficient to fill the concavities of four shields. 1 Disdaining either to surrender or to make any stipulation for himself personally, Demosthenes was on the point of killing himself with his ow.n sword the moment that the capit- ulation was concluded ; but his intention was prevented, and ho was carried off a disarmed prisoner by the Syracusans. 2 I do not think that Dr. Arnold's comment is satisfactory. The pressure oi the troops from the rear into the hither opening, while those in the front could not get out by the farther opening, would naturally cause this crowd and huddling inside. A road whieh passed right through the walled ground, entering at one side and coming out at the other, might well be called 6c5of Ivdev re KOL "ev&ev. Compare Dr. Arnold's Remarks on the Map of Syra- cuse, vol. iii, p. 281 ; as well as his note on vii, 81. I imagine the olive-trees to be here named, not for either of the two reasons mentioned by Dr. Arnold, but because they hindered the Athenians from seeing beforehand distinctly the nature of the inclosnrc into which they were hastening, and therefore prevented any precautions from being taken, such as that of forbidding too many troops from entering at once, etc. 1 Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27 ; Thucyd. vii, 82.
- This statement depends upon the very good authority of the contempo-
rary Syracusan, Philistus : see Pausanias, i, 29, 9 ; Philisti Fragm 46. ed
Didot.
