EMBARRASSMENT OF NIK1AS. 49 able, should be made clear. He contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was that of superior honor and advantage ; the position of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedemonians should bt apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in Athens vitn propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedaemonians, if their inten- tions were honorable, must show it forthwith : 1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring Am- phipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the Boeotians, unless the Boeotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens. 1 The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required : a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preced- ing day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy ; a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just ; but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all farther evasion. His miss-ion to Sparta failed altogether : the influence of Kleobulus and Xenares, the anti-Athenian ephors, was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Boeotians or compelled the Boeotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos, the menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a personal favor to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed ; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the humiliation of his retreat to Athens 1 Thuc;d. v, 46.
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