1 2 4 HISTORY OF GKEECE. even if Kleophon were ever so n: ach a gainer by the continu ance of war, yet, assuming Athens to be ultimately crushed k the war, he was certain beforehand to be deprived, not only of all his gains and his position, but of his life also. So much for the charge against him of corrupt interest. The question whether his advice was judicious, is not so easy to dis- pose of. Looking to the time when the proposition was made, we must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet in Asia had been just annihilated, and that the brief epistle itself, from Hippokrates to the ephors, divulging in so emphatic a manner the distress of his troops, was at this moment before the Athenian assembly. On the other hand, the despatches of the Athenian generals, announc- ing their victory, had excited a sentiment of universal triumph, manifested by public thanksgiving, at Athens :' nor can we doubt that Alkibiades and his colleagues promised a large ca- reer of coming success, perhaps the recovery of most part of the lost maritime empire. In this temper of the Athenian people and of their generals, justified as it was to a great degree by the reality, what is the proposition which comes from Endius ? What he proposes, is, in reality, no concession at all. Both parties to stand in their actual position ; to withdraw garrisons ; to restore prisoners. There was only one way in which Athens would have been a gainer by accepting these propositions. She would have withdrawn her garrison from Pylos, she would have been relieved from the garrison of Dekeleia ; such an exchange would have been a considerable advantage to her. To this we must add the relief arising from simple cessation of war, doubtless real and important. Now the question is, whether a statesman like Perikles would have advised his countrymen to be satisfied with such a measure of concession, immediately after the great victory of Kyzikus, and the two smaller victories preceding it ? I incline to believe that he would not. It would rather have appeared to him in the light of a diplomatic artifice, calculated to paralyze Athens during the interval while her enemies were defenceless, and to gain time for them to build a new fleet. 2 Spai'ta could not pledge herself 1 Diodor. xiii, 52.
- Philochorus (ap. Schol. ad Eurip. Orcst 371) appears to have said that
