134 HISTOEY OF GREECE. that KlearcLus,, strict anc harsh, even under ordinary circiui stances, became inexorable and oppressive, from exclusive anxietj for the subsistence of his soldiers ; and even locked up the stock of food while the population of the town were dying of hangei around him. Seeing that his only hope was from external relief he spJh'ed forth from the city to entreat aid from Pharnabazus and to get together, if possible, a fleet for some aggressive opera- tion that might divert the attention of the besiegers. He left the defence to Koeratadas and Helixus, in full confidence that the Byzantines were too much compromised by their revolt from Athens to venture to desert Sparta, whatever might be their suf- fering. But the favorable terms recently granted to Chalkedon, coupled with the severe and increasing famine, induced Kydon and a Byzantine party to open the gates by night, and admit Alkibiades with the Athenians into the wide interior square called the Thrakion. Helixus and Koeratadas, apprized of this attack only when the enemy had actually got possession of the town on all sides, vainly attempted resistance, and were compelled to sur- render at discretion : they were sent as prisoners to Athens, where Koeratadas contrived to escape during the confusion of the landing at Peirseus. Favorable terms were granted to the town, which was replaced in its position of a dependent ally of Athens, and probably had to pay up its arrears of tribute in the same manner as Chalkedon. 1 So slow was the process of siege in ancient times, that the reduction of Chalkedon and Byzantium occupied nearly the whole year ; the latter place surrendering about the beginning of winter. 2 Both of them, however, were acquisitions of capital importance to Athens, making her again undisputed mistress of the Bosphorus, and insuring to her two valuable tributary allies. Nor was this all the improvement which the summer had oper- ated in her position. The accommodation just concluded with Pharnabazus was also a step of great value, and still greater 1 Xenoph. Hellcn. i, 3, 15-22 ; Dtodor. xiii, 67 ; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31. The account given by Xenophon of the surrender of Byzantium, vhich I have followed in the text, is perfectly plain and probable. It does not con sist with the complicated stratagem described in Diodorus and Plutarch, *< R'ell as in Frontinus, iii, xi, 3 ; alluded to also in Polyainus, i, 48, 2.
- Xenoph. llellen. i. 4, 1.
