436 HISTORY OF GREECE. one felt perfectly well-informed, and confident in his own kno.vl> edge ; yet no one knew from whom, or by what steps, he had learned : no one had ever devoted any special reflection either to ends, or means, or obstructions : no one could explain or give a consistent account of the notions in his own mind, when pertinent questions were put to him : no one could teach another, as might be inferred, he thought, from the fact that there were no pro- fessed teachers, and that the sons of the best men were often destitute of merit : every one knew for himself, and laid down general propositions confidently, without looking up to any other man as knowing better ; yet there was no end of dissension and dispute on particular cases. 1 Such was the general contrast which Sokrates sought to im- press upon his hearers by a variety of questions bearing on it, directly or indirectly. One way of presenting it, which Plato devoted much of his genius to expand in dialogue, was, to discuss, Whether virtue be really teachable. How was it that superior men, like Aristeides and Perikles, 2 acquired the eminent qualities essential for guiding and governing Athens, since they neither learned them under any known master, as they had studied music and gymnastics, nor could insure the same excellences to their sons, either through their own agency or through that of any master ? Was it not rather the fact that virtue, as it was never expressly taught, so it was not really teachable ; but was vouch- safed or withheld according to the special volition and grace of the gods ? If a man has a young horse to be broken, or trained, he finds without difficulty a professed trainer, thoroughly conver- sant with the habits of the race, 3 to communicate to the animal the excellence required ; but whom can he find to teach virtue to his sons, with the like preliminary knowledge and assured result ? Nay, how can any one either teach virtue, or affirm virtue to be teachable, unless he be prepared to explain what virtue is, and what are the points of analogy and difference between its various branches; justice, temperance, fortitude, prudence, etc.? In several of the Platonic dialogues, the discussion turns on the 1 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 8, p. 7, D ; Xcn. Mem. iv, 4. 8.
- Xenoph. Mem. iv, 2, 2 ; Plato, Meno, c. 33, p. 94.
- Compare Plato. Apol. Sok. c. 4, p. 20, A; Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 25.