438 HISTORY OF GREECE. him. Upon this basis the fancied knowledge really tvsted ; and reason, when invoked at all, was called in simply as an handmaid, expositor, or apologist of the preexisting sentiment ; as an acces- sory after the fact, not as a test or verification. Every man found these persuasions in his own mind, without knowing how they became established there ; and witnessed them in others, as portions of a general fund of unexamined common-place and credence. Because the words were at once of large meaning, embodied in old and familiar mental processes, and surrounded by a strong body of sentiment, the general assertions in which they were embodied appeared self-evident and imposing to every one : so that, in spite of continual dispute in particular cases, no one thought himself obliged to analyze the general propositions them- selves, or to reflect whether he had verified their import, and could apply them rationally and consistently. 1 The phenomenon here adverted to is too obvious, even at the present day, to need further elucidation as matter of fact. In morals, in politics, in political economy, on all subjects relating to man and society, the like confident persuasion of knowledge without the reality is sufficiently prevalent : the like generation and propagation, by authority and example, of unverified convic- tions, resting upon strong sentiment, without consciousness of the steps or conditions of their growth ; the like enlistment of reason as the one-sided advocate of a preestablished sentiment ; the like illusion, because every man is familiar with the language, that therefore every man is master of the complex facts, judgments, nd tendencies, involved in its signification, and competent both to apply comprehensive words and to assume the truth or falsehood of large propositions, without any special analysis or study. 2 -avra //ev (says Sokrates to Euthydemus) lffu Sift TO nareveiv eldevai, ovff eaKhpu (Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 36): compare Plato, Alkibiad. i, c. 14, p. 110, A.
- " Moins une science est avancee, moins elle a etc' bien traitee, et plus ello
a be'soin d'etre enseigne'e. C'est ce qui me fait beancc up desircr qu'on ne renonce pas en France k 1'enscignement des sciences ide'ologiqncs, morales, et politiques ; qui, apres tout, sent des sciences comme les autres & la fiijff&rence pj-es. que ceux qui ne les ont pas e~tudiees sont persuades de si bonne Jot de les savoir, qu'ils se croient en tat d'en decider. (D?stutt de Tracy, Elemeni i'lde'ologie, Pre'f.icc, p. xxxiv, ed. Paris, 1827.)
