THEBAN ORDER OF BATTLE. 179 trustworthy. What the exact numbers were on either side, we are not permitted to know. Diodorus assigns about six thousand men to the Thebans ; Plutarch states the numbers of Kleombrotus at eleven thousand. 1 Without placing faith in these figures, we see good reason for believing that the Theban total was decidedly in- ferior. For such inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful tactics, and by a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all former Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in line, and had fought along the whole line ; or at least such had been the intention of the generals, and if it was not realized, the cause was to be sought in accidents of the ground, or backwardness or disorder on the part of some division of the soldiers. Departing from this habit, Epaminondas now arrayed his troops so as to bring his own left to bear with irresistible force upon the Spartan right, and to keep back the rest of his army compara- tively out of action. Knowing that Kleombrotus, with the Spar- tans and all the official persons, would be on the right of their own line, he calculated that, if successful on this point against the best troops, he should find little resistance from the remainder. Ac- cordingly he placed on his own left wing chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of fifty shields, with Pelopidas and the Sa- cred Band in front. His order of advance was disposed obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep column on the left should join bat- tle first, while the centre and right kept comparatively back and held themselves more in a defensive attitude. In 371 B. c., such a combination was absolutely new, and be- tokened high military genius. It is therefore no disgrace to Kleombrotus that he was not prepared for it, and that he adhered to the ordinary Grecian tactics of joining battle at once along the whole line. But so unbounded was the confidence reigning among the Spartans, that there never was any occasion on which peculiar precautions were less thought of. When, from their entrenched camp on the Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans encamped on an opposite eminence, separated from them by a small breadth of low ground and moderate declivities, their only impatience was to hurry on the decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping. Both the partisans and the opponents of Kleom- 1 Diodor. xv, 52-56 ; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 20.
