190 HISTORY OF GREECE. attack it in front, Jason strongly dissuaded tht enterprise as too perilous ; recommending that they should permit the enemy's de- parture under capitulation. " Be content (said he) with the great victory which you have already gained. Do not compromise it by attempting something yet more haza.'dous, against Lacedajmo- nians driven to despair in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago, you yourselves were in despair, and that your recent victory is the fruit of that very feeling. Remember that the gods take pleasure in bringing about these sudden changes of fortune."' Having by such representations convinced the Thebans, he ad dressed a friendly message to the Lacedaemonians, reminding them of their dangerous position, as well as of the little trust to be re- posed in their allies, and offering himself as mediator to nego- tiate for their safe retreat. Their acquiescence was readily given ; and at his instance, a truce was agreed to by both parties, assuring to the Lacedaemonians the liberty of quitting Bceotia. In spite of the agreement, however, the Lacedaemonian commander placed little faith either in the Thebans or in Jason, apprehending a fraud for the purpose of inducing him to quit the camp and of attacking him on the march. Accordingly, he issued public orders in the camp for every man to be ready for departure after the evening meal, and to march in the night to Kithaeron, with a view of pass- ing that mountain on the next morning. Having put the enemy on this false scent, he directed his real night-march by a different and not very easy way, first to Kreusis, next to JEgosthena in the Megarian territory .2 The Thebans offered no opposition ; nor is 1 Pausanias states that immediately after the battle, Epaminondas gave permission to the allies of Sparta to depart and go home, by which permis- sion they profited, so that the Spartans now stood alone in the camp (Paus. ix, 14, 1 ). This however is inconsistent with the account of Xenophon jvi, 4, 26), and I think improbable. Sievers (Geschichte, etc. p. 247) thinks that Jason preserved the Spartans by outwitting and deluding Epaminondas. But it appears to me that tho storming of the Spartan camp was an arduous enterprise, wherein more Thebans than Spartans would have been slain : moreover, the Spartans were masters of the port of Kreusis, so that there was little chance of starv- ing out the camp before reinforcements arrived. The capitulation granted by Epaminondas seems to have been really the wisest proceeding.
- Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 22-25.
The road from Kreusis to Leuktra, however, must have been (hat (f which Kleombrotus arrived.
