PLANS OF EPAMINONDAS. 213 walls of Mantinea. Epaminondas with the Theban army wan approaching to their aid, and daily expected ; a sum of ten talents having been lent by the Eleians to defray the cost. 1 He had been invited by them and by others of the smaller Peloponnesian states, who felt the necessity of some external protector against Sparta, and who even before they applied to Thebes for aid, had so- licited the like interference from Athens (probably under the general presidency accepted by Athens, and the oaths interchanged by her with various inferior cities, since the battle of Leuktra), but had experienced a refusal. 2 Epaminondas had been preparing for this contingency ever since the battle of Leuktra. The first use made of his victory had been to establish or confirm the ascendency of Thebes both over the recusant Boeotian cities and over the neighboring Phokians and Lokrians, etc. After this had been accomplished, he must have been occupied (during the early part of 370 B. c.) in anxiously watching the movements of Jason of Pheras, who had already announced his design of marching with an imposing force to Del- phi for the celebration of the Pythian games (about August 1.) Though this despot was the ally of Thebes, yet as both his power, and his aspirations towards the headship of Greece, 3 were well known, no Theban general, even of prudence inferior to Epamin- ondas, could venture in the face of such liabilities to conduct away the Theban force into Peloponnesus, leaving Boeotia uncovered. The assassination of Jason relieved Thebes from such apprehen- sions, and a few weeks sufficed to show that his successors were far less formidable in power as well as in ability. Accordingly, in the autumn of 370 B. c. Epaminondas had his attention free to turn to Peloponnesus, for the purpose both of maintaining the anti-Spartan revolution which had taken place in Tegea, and of seconding the pronounced impulse among the Arcadians towards federative coalition. But the purposes of this distinguished man went farther still ; embracing long-sighted and permanent arrangements, such as should forever disable Sparta from recovering her prominent sta* 1 Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 19. 8 Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Demosthenes, Orat, pro Megalopolit. pp. 205-207, s. 13-23 3 Diodor. xv, 60.
