254 HISTORY OF GREECE. ship on the part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst abun- dant discussion in the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedae- monian and others as well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship must be vested jointly and equally hi Sparta and Athens ; and the only point in debate was, how such an arrange- ment could be most suitably carried out. It was at first proposed that the former should command on land, the latter at sea ; a dis- tribution, which, on first hearing, found favor both as equitable and convenient, until an Athenian named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedaemonians had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots ; while the land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now pointed out, Athe- nians, in great numbers and of the best quality, would be placed under Spartan command ; while few Lacedaemonians, and those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command ; which would be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and Sparta, in periods of five days ; and his amendment was adopted. 1 Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between the two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated for success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas. The allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station, and to guard the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreae, 2 so as to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus. It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban invader away from her frontier, had been held, during the war from 394-387 B. c., by the Athe- nians and Thebans against herself, to prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into Attica and Boeotia. Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there been any necessity for defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an extra-Peloponnesian assailant. But now, even to send a force from Sparta to Corinth, recourse must have been had to transport by sea, either across the Argolic 1 Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10-14. 2 Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 15, 16 ; Diodor. xv. 68
