336 HISTORY 3F GREECE. But I cannot adopt the view of Xenophot, that such resolution was forced upon Epaminondas, against his own will, by a desperate position, rendering it impossible for him to get away without fight- ing, by the disappointment of finding so few allies on his own side, and so many assembled against him, and by the necessity of wiping off the shame of his two recent failures (at Sparta and at Mantinea) or perishing in the attempt. 1 This is an estimate of the position of Epaminondas, not consistent with the facts narrated by Xenophon himself. It could have been no surprise to the Theban general that the time had arrived for ordering a battle. With what other view had he come into Peloponnesus ? Or for what other purpose could he have brought so numerous an army ? Granting that he expected greater support in Peloponnesus than he actually found, we cannot imagine him to have hoped that his mere pres- ence, without fighting, would suffice to put down enemies courage- ous as well as powerful. Xenophon exaggerates the importance of the recent defeats (as he terms them) before Sparta and Man- tinea. These were checks or disappointments rather than defeats. On arriving at Tegea, Epaminondas had found it practicable (which he could not have known beforehand) to attempt a coup dt main, first against Sparta, next against Mantinea. Here were acci- dental opportunities which his genius discerned and turned to account. Their success, so near to actual attainment, would have been a prodigious point gained ; 2 but their accidental failure left liirn not worse off than he was before. It remained for him then, having the enemy before him in the field, and no farther opportu- nities of striking at them unawares by side-blows, to fight them openly ; which he and all around him must-have contemplated, from their first entrance into Peloponnesus, as the only probable way of deciding the contest. The army of Epaminondas, far from feeling that sentiment of disappointed hope and stern necessity which Xenophon ascribes to their commander, were impatient to fight under his .orders, and 1 Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 18. airdf <5e ^eXvpaa/uevof ~avTu,naai T>J tavrov <5ofj KGOITO. T/TTTJ/LIEVOC fikv kv AaKfdai/jovt. ai)v 7ro/l/l<2) 6~AirtK& v~' oAtyuv, TJTTTJ- fievof 8e ev llavTivsia l-KTrofj.aM, alriof <5e -ye-yevrj/iiEvof 6iu TJJV vijoov GTpuTEiav TOV ovvfOTuvcu AdKedai/ioviovf aal 'Ap/coAif xal ' 'Atf^vnt'ouf uare OVK ttioKei <5t varov elvai uuaxei irapeh&Eiv , etc. ' Polybius, ix, 8, 2.
