BATTLE OF MANTINEA. 343 toot, in order to take the Athenians in the rear if they should attempt it. All these fresh dispositions for attack, made on the spot, must have occupied time, and caused much apparent movement. To constitute both the column of infantry, and the column of cavalry, for attack on his left and to post the body of reserve on the rising ground at his right against the Athenians were operations which the enemy from their neighboring position could not help seeing. Yet they either did not heed, or did not understand, what was going on. 1 Nor was it until Epaminondas, perceiving all to be completed, actually gave the word of command to " take up arms," that they had any suspicion of the impending danger. As soon as they saw him in full march moving rapidly towards them, surprise and tumultuous movement pervaded their body. The scattered hoplites ran to their places ; the officers exerted every effort to establish regular array ; the horsemen hastened to bridle their horses and resume their breast-plates. 2 And though the space dividing the two armies was large enough to allow such mischief to be partially corrected, yet soldiers thus taken unawares, hur- ried, and troubled, were not in condition to stand the terrific shock of chosen Theban hoplites in deep column. The grand force of attack, both of cavalry and infantry, which Epaminondas organized on his left, was triumphant in both its portions. His cavalry, powerfully aided by the intermingled dart- ers and light troops from Thessaly, broke and routed the enemy's cavalry opposed to them, and then restraining themselves from pur- suit, turned to fall upon the phalanx of infantry. Epaminondas, on his part, with his Theban column, came into close conflict with the Mantinean and Lacedaemonian line of infantry, whom, after a desperate struggle of shield, spear, and sword, he bore down by superior force and weight. He broke through the enemy's line of infantry at this point, compelling the Lacedaemonians opposed io him, after a brave and murderous resistance, to turn their backs and take to flight. The remaining troops of the enemy's line, seeing the best portion of their army defeated and in flight, turned 1 Perhaps Epaminondas may have contrived in part to conceal what was going on by means of cavalry-movements in his front. Something of the kind seems alluded to by Polyaanus (ii, 3, 14). 8 Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22,
