NAVAL BATTLE OFF KATANA. 495 for special occasions, and then dismissed. Dionysius farther de- spatched envoys to Sparta, soliciting a reinforcement of a thousand mercenary auxiliaries. Having thus provided the best defence that he could through the territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force to Katana, having his fleet also moving in coope- ration, immediately off shore. Towards this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now moving, in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast along with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while Imilkon intended himself to march with the land force on shore, keeping constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support. But his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden eruption took place from JEtna ; so that the stream of lava from the mountain to the sea forbade ah 1 possibility of march- ing along the shore to Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit with his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was unavoidably cut off from the fleet ; which under the command of Magon was sailing southward towards Katana. Dionysius availed himself of this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately. The Cartha- ginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of five hundred sail in all ; a portion of which, however, were not strictly ships of war, but armed merchant-men, that is, furnished with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars. But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand to cooperate with his fleet; an advantage which in ancient naval warfare counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to the ships, and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the enemy's means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he came in sight of the Grecian land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet rowing up to attack him, was nevertheless constrained unwillingly to accept the battle. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral, though ordered by Dionysius to concentrate his ships as much as possible, in conse- quence of his inferior numbers, attacked with boldness, and even with temerity ; advancing himself with thirty ships greatly before the rest, and being apparently farther out tc sea than the enemy. His bravery at first appeared successful, dcs'iroying or damaging the headmost ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers
