auO HISTORY OF GREECE. was his plan, he soon abandoned it, and confined himself io the slower process of reducing the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise, however, was by no means encouraging. "We must recollect that he was not, like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolae ; able from thence to stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left arm northward to the tea at Trogilus. As far as we are able to make out, he never asceided the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of Epipoke ; thougk it seems that at this time there was no line of wall along the south- ern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolae ; so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around remained partially open on two sides, westward, through the Euryalus at the upper extremity of Epipolae, and northward towards Thapsus and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of Epipolos. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification, which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least, on two sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much stronger that the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle, yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude their store-ships, and en- sure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies ; while several desul- tory encounters took place, both of land-force and of shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly raised their spirits. One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to Imilkon's fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from their station sent out forty ships of war ; upon which the Syracusans equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with numbers decidedly superior, and completely
