2J4 HISTORY OF GREECE. Much of the futuie history of Greece turned upon the manner in which Athens dealt with these two conflicting messages. Tho situation of Amphipolis, commanding the passage over the Stry- mon, was not only all-important as shutting up Macedonia to the eastward and as opening the gold regions around Mount Pan- gaeus but was also easily defensible by the Athenians from sea- ward, if once acquired. Had they been clear-sighted in the appreciation of chances, and vigilant in respect to future defence, they might now have acquired this important place, and might have held it against the utmost efforts of Philip. But that fatal inaction which had become their general besetting sin, was on the present occasion encouraged by sorae plausible, yet delusive, pleas. The news of the danger of the Amphipolitans would be not un- welcome at Athens where strong aversion was entertained to- wards them, as refractory occupants of a territory not their own, and as having occasioned repeated loss and humiliation to the Athenian arms. Nor could f he Athenians at once shift their point of view, so as to contemplate the question on the ground of policy alone, and to recognize these old enemies as persons whose in terests had now come into harmony with their own. On the other hand, the present temper of the Athenians towards Philip was highly favorable. Not on'.y had they made peace with him during the preceding year, bat they also felt that he had treated them well both in evacuatip^ Amphipolis and in dismissing honorably their citizens who fwi been taken prisoners in the army of his competitor Argaeus, 1 Hence they were predisposed to credit his positive assurance, fLat he only wished to take the place in order to expel a troublesome population who had wronged and annoyed him, and that be Tould readily hand it over to its rightful owners the Athenians. To grant the application of the Amphipolitans for aid, would thus appear, at Athens, to be courting a new war and breaking nlth a valuable friend, in order to protect an odious enemy, an4 to secure an acquisition which would at all events some to them, even if they remained still, through the cession of Philip it is necessary to dwell upon the motives which deter ' ~yv 'Aftfyinohiv vfierepav elvai ld>r) yap iKnoTiiopKrjaaf ipilv uro upuv <ir ot'crav ifierepav, aW oil ruv ^ovrwv. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144.
