278 HISTORY OF GREECE. qualities partly because he espoused and sanctioned the most dangerous infirmity of the Athenian mind. His biographers mis- lead our judgment by pointing our attention chiefly to the last twenty years of his long life, after the battle of Chagroneia. At that time, -when the victorious military force of Macedonia hud been fully organized, and that of Greece comparatively prostrated, it might be argued plausibly (I do not say decisively, even then) that submission to Macedonia had become a fatal necessity ; and lhat attempts to resist could only end by converting bad into worse. But the peace-policy of Phokion which might be called prudence after the accession of Alexander was ruinously imprudent as well as dishonorable during the reign of Philip. The odds were all against Philip in his early years ; they shifted and became more and more in his favor, only because his game was played well, and that of his opponents badly. The superiority of force was at first so much on the side of Athens, that if she had been willing to employ it, she might have made sure of keeping Philip at least within the limits of Macedonia. All depended upon her will ; upon the question, whether her citizens were prepared in their own minds to incur the expense and fatigue of a vigorous foreign policy whether they would handle their pikes, open their purses, and forego the comforts of home, for the maintenance )f Grecian and Athenian liberty against a growing, but not as yet irresistible destroyer. To such a sacrifice the Athenians could not bring themselves to submit ; and in consequence of that reluc- tance, they were driven in the end to a much graver and more .rreparable sacrifice the loss of liberty, dignity, and security. Now it was precisely at such a moment, and when such a question was pending, that the influence of the peace-loving Phokion was most ruinous. His anxiety that the citizens should be buried at home in their own sepulchres his despair, mingled with con- tempt, of his countrymen and their refined habits his hatred of the orators who might profit by an increased war-expenditure 1 all contributed to make him discourage public effort, and await passively the preponderance of the Macedonian arms ; thus play- ing the game of Philip, and siding, though himself incorruptible, with the orators in Philip's pay. 1 See the replies of Phokion in Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23.
