PERSONAL MILITARY- SERVICE. 315 and then sending aid to the point attacked, was ruinous; the war must be carried on by a standing force put in motion before- hand. 1 To provide and pay such a standing force, is one of the main points in the project of Demosthenes. The absolute necessity that it shall consist, in large proportion at least, of citizens, is. another. To this latter point he reverts again and again, insisting that the foreign mercenaries sent out to make their pay where or how they could, and unaccompanied by Athenian citizens were at best useless and untrustworthy. They did more mischief to friends and allies, who were terrified at the very tidings of their approach than to the enemy. 2 The general, unprovided will funds to pay them, was compelled to follow them wheresoever they chose to go, disregarding his orders received from the city. To try him afterwards for that which he could not help, was unprofit- able disgrace. But if the troops were regularly paid ; if, besides, a considerable proportion of them were Athenian citizens, them- selves interested in success, and inspectors of all that was done ; then the general would be found willing and able to attack the enemy with vigor and might be held to a rigorous accountabil- ity, if he did not. Such was the only way in which the formidable and ever-growing force of their enemy Philip could be success- fully combated. As matters now stood, the inefficiency of Athe- nian operations was so ridiculous, that men might be tempted to doubt whether Athens was really in earnest. Her chief military ra^iEV, KOL Tovroif uvridoOEtc itoiovpEda Kal nepl %pri fiu.ru v nopov etc. 1 Demosthen.Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. del //? (3or]-&eiaic iro^efjielv (varepiov- JIEV ~yiip airuvruv) u/M.al ra>v arpaTturuv, ftiadov iropiaavras no.} orpariuTaf olxEiovf umrep EKOKTCtf ruv CTpaTriyov/j.evuv TrapaKaTaaTqaav- raf, etc. p. 53. s. 51. Kal ol filv ixdpol KarayEAuciv, oi 6e avpuaxoi Tsdvaai r ifei rot'f Toiovruvf <'.'noaToh.ov t etc.
