no HISTORT OF GREECE. receivini^ intelligence of the death of Memnon. Confirming th« appointment of Pharnabazus (made provisionally by the dying Memnon) as admiral, he at the same time despatched Thymodes (son of Mentor and nephew of Memnon) to bring away from the fleet the Grecian mercenaries who served aboard, to be incorpo- rated with the main Persian army.* Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations was henceforward to be ti*ansferred from the sea to the land. It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco- Persian drama — because Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight, and set before us little except the secondary points in the case. Thus, for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of waiting for him on the spacious plains be- yond Mount Amanus. Now, unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this step augmented the chances in favor of the Macedonians. But it was a step upon which no material consequences turned ; for the Persian army under Da- rius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open plain ; as was afterwards proved at Arbela. The real imprudence — the neglect of the Memnonian warning — consisted infighting the battle at all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians, to be held as posts of defence against the invader. If Darius erred, it was not so much in relinquishing the open plain of Sochi, as in originally preferring that plain with a pitch- ed battle, to the strong lines of defence offered by Taurus and Amanus. The narrative of Arrian, exact perhaps in what it atfirms, is not only brief and incomplete, but even omits on various occa- sions to put in relief the really important and determining points. While halting at Gordium, Alexander was joined by those newly-married Macedonians whom he had sent home to winter, and who now came back with reinforcements to the number of 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry, together with 200 Thessalian cavalry, and 150 Eleians.- As soon as his troops had been suf- 1 Arrian, ii. 2, 1 ; ii. 13, 3. Curtius, iii. 3.. 1. » Arrian, i. 29, 6.
