142 HISTORY OF GREECE. tants of Tenedos invited them and ensured their si; jcess ; those of Chios attempted to do the same, but were coerced bj Phama- bazus, who retained the city by means of his insular partisans, ApoUonides and others, with a military force. The Macedonian admirals laid siege to the town, and were presently enabled to carry it by their friends within. Pharaabazus was here cap- tured with his entire force ; twelve triremes thoroughly armed and manned, thirty store-ships, several privateers, and 3000 Gre cian mercenaries. Aristonikus, philo-Persian despot of Me thymna — arriving at Chios shortly afterwards, but ignorant of the capture — was entrapped into the harbor, and made prisoner There remained only Mitylene, which was held for the Persians by the Athenian Chares, with a garrison of 2000 men ; who, however, seeing no hope of holding out against the Macedonians, consented to evacuate the city on condition of a fi*ee departure. The Persians were thus expelled from the sea, from all footing among the Grecian islands, and from the vicinity of Greece and Macedonia.^ These successes were in full progress, when Alexander him- self directed his march from Tyre to Egypt, stopping in his way to besiege Gaza. This considerable town, the last before enter- ing on the desert track between Syria and Egpyt, was situated between one and two miles from the sea. It was built upon a lofty artificial mound, and encircled with a high wall ; but its main defence was derived from the deep sand immediately around it, as well as from the mud and quicksand on its coast. It was defended by a brave man, the eunuch Batis, with a strong garrison of Arabs, and abundant provision of every kind. Confiding in the strength of the place, Batis refused to admit Alexander. Moreover his judgment was confirmed by the Macedonian engineers themselves, who, when Alexander first surveyed the walls, pronounced it to be impregnable, chiefly from the height of its supporting mound. But Alexander could not endure the thought of tacitly confessing his inability to take Gaza. The more diflSicult the enterprise, the greater was the charm for him, and the grreater would be the astonishment ' Cuitius, iv. 5, 14-22; Arrian, iii. 2, 4-8.
