PLANS AND PRETENCES OF ALEXANDER 51 well as by the character which Alexander thought fit to assume. To take revenge on Persia for the invasion of Greece by Xer« xes, and to liberate the Asiatic Greeks, had been the scheme of the Spartan Agesilaus, and of the Phertean Jason ; with hopes grounded on the memorable expedition and safe return of the Ten Thousand. It had been recommended by the rhetor Isok- rates, first to the combined force of Greece, while yet -Grecian cities were free, under the joint headship of Athens and Sparta — next, to Philip of Macedou as the chief of united Greece, when his victorious arms had extorted a recognition of headship, setting aside both Athens and Sparta. The enterprising ambi- tion of Philip was well pleased to be nominated chief of Greece for the execution of this project. From him it passed to his yet more ambitious son. Though really a scheme of Macedonian appetite and for Macedonian aggrandizement, the expedition against Asia thus becomes thrust into the series of Grecian events, under the Pan- hellenic pretence of retaliation for the long past insults of Xer- xes. I call it a pretence, because it had ceased to be a real Hel- lenic feeling, and served now two different purposes ; first, to en- noble the undertaking in the eyes of Alexander himself, whose mind was very accessible to religious and legendary sentiment, and who willingly identified himself with Agamemnon or Achil- les, immortalized as executors of the collective vengeance of Greece for Asiatic insult — next, to assist in keeping the Greeks quiet during his absence. He was himself aware that the real sympathies of the Greeks were rather adverse than favorable to his success. Apart from this body of extinct sentiment, ostentatiously re- kindled for Alexander's purposes, the position of the Greeks in reference to his Asiatic conquests was very much the same as that of the German contingents, especially those of the Confede- ration of the Rhine, who served in the grand army with which the Emperor Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812. They had no public interest in the victory of the invader, which could end only by reducing them to still greater prostration. They were likely to adhere to their leader as long as his power continued unimpaired, but no longer. Yet Napoleon thought himself enti- tled to reckon upon them as if they had been Frenchmen, and tc
