INHERENT WEAKNESS OF THE ENGLISH COMPANIES 89 rate " voyages of 1601 to 1612 had indeed given place to recurring joint stocks. But the change only super- seded temporary groups of adventurers for single voy- ages by somewhat less temporary groups of adventurers for three or four voyages. Each group, whether for a single voyage, or for three or four, knew that its exist- ence was limited to a brief term of years. Its object was to make as much money as it could within the period allotted to it, and to spend as little as possible on fortifications which it would have to leave behind in the East and make over at a low valuation to the next group of adventurers. The Dutch East India Company felt its interests to be bound up with those of the Dutch Government, adopted the state policy, and willingly spent vast sums on troops and fortresses in the confidence that it would reap the permanent fruits of its territorial conquests. The English Company, in fact, still remained a pri- vate venture; the Dutch Company knew itself to be a national enterprise. The difference received emphasis from the personal character of King James. The Lon- don Company's charter was never quite safe from court intrigues. If royal favourites could no longer procure a license for English interlopers, his Majesty was King of Scotland as well as of England, and the charter did not affect his northern subjects. In the crisis of its struggle with the Dutch, the Londpn Company learned with dismay that the king had in 1617 granted a patent to Sir James Cuningham for a Scottish Company to trade to Greenland, Muscovy, and the East Indies—
