Sir William Lee, Chief Justice, in his judgment in the case of Olive vs. Ingraham, expressly says that he had perused them, and that they contained the expression of Hakewell's entire approval of the principles upon which they were decided, and of the results deduced; and we have the statement of Lord Chief Justice Lee, who had carefully examined those cases, that in the case of Holt vs. Lyle, it was determined that a feme sole freeholder may claim a vote for Parliament men; but if married, her husband must vote for her. In the case of Olive vs. Ingraham, Justice Probyn says:
The case of Holt vs. Lyle, lately mentioned by our Lord Chief Justice, is a very strong case; "They who pay ought to choose whom they shall pay." And the Lord Chief Justice seemed to have assented to that general proposition, as authority for the correlative proposition, that '" women, when sole, had a right to vote."" At all events, there is here the strongest possible evidence that in the reign of James I., the feme sole, being a freeholder of a country, or what is the same thing, of a county, of a city, or town, or borough, where, of custom, freeholders had the right to vote, not only had, but exercised the parliamentary franchise. If married, she could not vote in respect merely of her freehold, not because of the incapacities of coverture, but for this simple reason, that, by the act of marriage, which is an act of low, the title of the feme sole freeholder becomes vested for life in the husband. The qualification to vote was not personal, but real; consequently, her right to vote became suspended as soon and for as long as she was married. I am bound to consider that the question as to what weight is due to the dictum of my Lord Coke is entirely disposed of by those cases from the reign of James I. and George IL, and that the authority of the lutter is unimpeached by any later authority, as the cases of Rex. vs. Stubles, and Regina vs. Aberavon, abundantly show.
In Anstey's Notes on the New Reform Act of 1867, the authorities and precedents upon the right of women to vote in England are examined and summed up, and the author concludes:
It is submitted that the weight of authority is very greatly in favor of the female right of suffrage. Indeed, the authority against it is contained in the short and hasty dictum of Lord Coke, referred to above. It was set down by him in his last and least authoritative institute, and it is certain that he bas been followed neither by the great lawyers of his time nor by the judicature. The principles of the law in relation to the suffrage of females will be found In Coates vs. Lyle, Holt vs. Ingraham, and The King vs. Stubles, cases decided under the strict rules for the construction of statutes.
It can not be questioned that from time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, unmarried women have been by the laws of England competent voters, subject to the freehold qualification which applied alike to men and women. Married women could not vote because they were not freeholders; by the common law their property upon marriage became vested in the husband. So that it appears that the admission of woman to participation in the affairs of government would not be so much of an innovation upon the theories and usage of the past as is by some supposed.
In England the theory was that in property representation, all property should be represented. Here the theory is that of personal representation, which, of course, if carried out fully, includes the representation of all property. In England, as we have seen, the owner of the property, whether male or female was entitled to representation, no distinction being made on account of sex. If the doctrine contended for by the majority of the committee be correct, then this Government is less liberal upon this question than the