and would not be presumed in a law, much less in a constitution. The American authorities are strongly in favor of the larger meaning.
The term is used in the second section of the original Constitution, article four, which provides that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." In Corfield vs. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. R., 380, the court say: "The inquiry is what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? They may be all comprehended under the following general heads: (Here follows a statement of numerous rights, civil and political, closing as follows:) "To which may be added the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised." And in the Dred Scott case, 19 Howard, 476, Mr. Justice Daniel says:
There is not, it is believed, to be found in the theories of writers on government, or in any actual experiment heretofore tried, an exposition of the term 'citizen' which has not been understood as conferring the actual possession and enjoyment, or the perfect right of acquisition and enjoyment, of an entire equality of privileges, civil and political.
And the supreme court of Kentucky, 1 Little R., 333, says:
No one can, in the correct sense of the term, be a citizen of a State who is not entitled, upon the terms prescribed by the institutions of the State, to all the rights and privileges conferred by those institutions upon the highest class of society.
These are American authorities, and would seem to settle the question that the term has not acquired a distinctive American meaning variant from the well-established general meaning.
It is said, in the next place, and finally, that the second section of the XIV. Amendment shows clearly that the term "citizen" could not have been used in the sense of full citizenship. This objection is the most serious one that the argument encounters. That section, so far as relates to this subject, is as follows:
When the right to vote is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State being twenty-one years of age and citizens of the United States, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
The consideration of this section is perfectly legitimate in the inquiry as to the meaning of the first section. It is said, with great force, that here is an implied admission that the States retained the power to exclude black men from the right to vote, and it will be asked why, if that right is absolutely conferred by the first section, and is one of the privileges and immunities of citizens which no State may abridge, the amendment does not boldly forbid any such State legislation, instead of merely imposing certain limitations upon the State that should assume to exercise such right of exclusion.
Two answers have been made by public writers on the subject which are merely specious. One is, that if the second section be construed as admitting the right of a State to exclude certain classes of men from the franchise, yet it could not operate as an admission of the right to exclude women. The fallacy here is, that if the citizenship conferred by the first section does not secure against all legislation the right of suffrage to men, it does not secure it to women; the question being merely as to the meaning of the term "citizen" as used, and not as to its application to