idea of the whole is already made and needs not to be altered. Experience in the higher sense of investigation of nature is rendered impossible by the fact, that we are supposed to know all the ultimate principles of things; but these ultimate principles of scholasticism are at bottom only words with extremely indefinite meaning, abstractions obtained by a series of jumps from every-day experience, which has not been tried and refined in the crucible of science, and is therefore worthless; and the higher the abstraction is raised, the farther it withdraws from the guiding hand of experience, the more venerable and more important do these 'abstracta' appear, and we can finally come to a mutual understanding about them, though again only through figures and metaphors[1]. Science, according to the scholastic method, is a playing with abstract conceptions; the best player is he who can so combine them together, that the real contradictions are skilfully concealed. On the contrary, the object of true investigation, whether in philosophy or in natural science, is to make unsparing discovery of existing contradictions and to question the facts until our conceptions are cleared up, and if necessary the whole theory and general view is replaced by a better. In the Aristotelian philosophy and in scholasticism facts are merely examples for the illustration of fixed abstract conceptions, but in the real investigation of nature they are the fruitful soil from which new conceptions, new combinations of thought, new theories, and general views spring and grow. The most pernicious feature in scholasticism and the Aristotelian philosophy is the confounding of mere conceptions and words with the objective reality of the things denoted by them; men took a special pleasure in deducing the nature of things from the original meaning of the words, and even the question of the existence or non-existence of a thing
- ↑ See the excellent account of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies and of scholasticism in Albert Lange's 'Geschichte des Materialismus,' second edition, 1874.
