by laws similar in their nature and operation to that Act. Whichever way they looked, they perceived that the United States ought soon to become as powerful in shipping as any nation in the world. They insisted that, upon the closest examination of the subject, they were better prepared for a Navigation Act than England had been when the British Navigation Act was passed in 1660. They argued that though the registered tonnage of that kingdom did not then exceed ninety-six thousand tons, it had reached close upon eight hundred thousand tons in 1774, an increase, in little more than a century, of about seven hundred and four thousand tons. Why, therefore, exclaimed the Baltimore shipwrights, why should not we adopt a similar wise policy?
Arguments such as these, reiterated over and over during a course of years, produced in time their effect upon Congress, many of whose members had been strongly opposed to the treaty with England. French influence was also brought to bear in every conceivable way against it, and at last the protectionists of the United States were enabled to carry a measure through the Legislature sanctioning certain differential duties in favour of their own vessels as against those of England trading with their ports. From this time commenced that war of retaliation which, in one shape or other, continued between the two nations for nearly half a century.
In the fifteenth article of the treaty of commerce and navigation the British government had reserved the right of countervailing these discriminating duties, and the United States had bound themselves
