XI ON PRESERVING APPEARANCES ' ARGUMENT F I. Mr. F. H. Bradley's antithesis of Appearance' and 'Reality as a catchword. II. His criterion of the 'non-contradiction' of ultimate reality. But (1) the criterion not ultimate, and used too recklessly. It is applied to merely verbal difficulties. It is meaningless to call an unknowable Absolute real, and this explains nothing about appearances. Nothing even apparently real can be really contradictory. Non-contradiction is only a special form of Harmony, and the rejection of contradiction is only a form of the struggle towards satisfaction. Other modes of reaching harmony. Harmony a postulate. (2) The criterion stultifies itself by condemning everything, nor is it saved by the doctrine of Degrees.' III. A valid doctrine of the relation of appearance to reality must eschew the transcendence which renders Mr. Bradley's Absolute futile. Necessity of retaining a grasp on reality throughout. The growth of reality: (1) the reality of immediate experience our starting-point and end. (2) Higher realities' inferred to explain it, but remain secondary. Their variety and relativity to purpose and need of a final synthesis in (3) ultimate reality. IV. As to this five principles to be laid down (1) Ultimate Reality must be made a real explanation. (2) 'Appearances must be really preserved. (3) Primary reality of immediate experience to be recognised. The reality even of dreams. The reality of the higher world of Religion, How Idealism makes a difference. (4) The greater efficiency of the higher reality. (5) Why Ultimate Reality must be absolutely satisfactory. Because otherwise it would not be regarded as ultimate. Why truth cannot be evil. If it were, its pursuit would cease. Only complete satisfaction would bring finality of knowledge, and that only if not merely conceived, but actually experienced. The 'beatific vision' as the ideal of knowledge. I THE ambition of this paper is not, as might perhaps wrongly be conjectured from a hasty perusal of its title, 1 This essay appeared in Mind for July 1903 (N.S. No. 47) The chief additions are in IV. (3), (4), and (5). The constructive problem it deals with is that indicated at the end of Axioms as Postulates (Personal Idealism, p. 133). 183
