John of Salisbury, who was present through the whole proceedings, leaves it an open question whether the offence lay in a substantial disagreement with 'the rules' or in the mere appearance of such a disagreement, arising from the unusual form of the words Gilbert employed:[1] for, he remarks, it is certain that a good many things are now handled by scholars in public which when he put them forward were reckoned as profane novelties. John's criticism of the character of the prosecution betrays well enough the general estimate of it among cultivated men outside the immediate circle of partisans. He doubts whether Gilbert's accusers were moved by the zeal of faith, or by emulation of a more illustrious and deserving name, or by a desire to get favour with the abbat, whose authority was then supreme. As to abbat Bernard himself, he adds, there are several opinions, some thinking one way and some another, in reference to his having acted with such vigour against men of so great renown in letters as Peter Abailard and the aforesaid Gilbert, as to procure the condemnation of the one, to wit, Peter, and to use all his power to condemn the other. How could a man of so singular a holiness have broken out into such intemperance as his conduct would seem to imply? We cannot think of jealousy as the moving principle here; Bernard must have been actuated by a righteous zeal. But as to the object of his assault, John could as little be persuaded that Gilbert had really committed himself to views from which Bernard was bound to dissent: for – the reason is curious and characteristic – Gilbert was a man of the clearest intellect, and of the widest reading; he had spent some sixty years in study and the exercise of literature, and was so ripe in liberal culture as to be surpassed by no one, rather it was believed that in all things he excelled all men.
There was thus a presumption in Gilbert's favour possibly not less powerful than the evidence against him.
- ↑ Cf. Otto i. 46 p. 376: 'Consuetus ex ingenii subtilis magnitudine ac rationum acumine multa praeter communem hominum morem dicere.' Compare too ch. 52, p. 379.
