leaves altogether an open question. He is as little disposed to magnify the pretensions of the prince to whom he addressed his work, as he is to admit any theory of the indefeasible prerogative of kingship per se; prerogative indeed, strictly speaking, the king has none, for the authority which he receives by the act of election is purely official; the 'fountain of justice' remains with the law-giver, the people, whose instrument he is and to whom he is responsible.[1] He has to interpret the law, not to make it. So too the officers of the state derive their commission from the people, albeit the king, in conformity with law, decides the detail of their appointment, together with the other necessary arrangements of the executive government. Once establish the principle, and the consequences are easy to draw. The king's power is limited in every possible direction. He has the eye of the people or of its delegates on all his actions. He may be restrained or even deposed if he overpass his prescribed bounds; and even though his conduct be not amenable to the letter of the law, he is still subject to the final judgement of the national will.[2] On no side is there any room for despotism; in no point is he absolute.
Such are the conditions which Marsiglio deemed proper for the main object of his speculations, the defence of peace in the civil state, and which occupy the first book of his treatise. But among the six necessary constituents of society which he enumerates from Aristotle, – those who devote themselves to husbandry and handicraft, to provide its material support, those who defend it from
- ↑ We have, says Marsiglio, to explain the 'causam effectivam, instituentem et determinantem reliqua officiorum seu partium civitatis. Hanc autem primam dicimus legislatorem [the synonym with Marsiglio for 'civium universitas']; secundariam vero, quasi instrumentalem seu executivam, dicimus principantem, per autoritatem huius a legislatore sibi concessam, secundum formam sibi traditam ab eodem, legem videlicet, secundum quam semper agere ac disponere debet, quantum potest, actus civiles:' Lib. i. 15 pp. 175 sq.
- ↑ Siquidem [principantis excessus] lege determinates, secundum legem corrigendus; si vero non, secundum legislatoris sententiam: et lege debet determinari quantum possibile fuerit: Cap. 18 p. 185.
