have right without actual possession, and power without the means of exercising it. No catholic, for instance, will deny that the power of the keys is committed to the priest, albeit he have none subjected to his power. Dominion then is neither a right nor a power; it is a habit of the reasonable nature,[1] essentially involved in the existence of that nature, and irrespective of any condition except that of being set above something inferior to it. Thus, in the case of the Creator, it seems probable that his dominion is immediate and of itself, by virtue of the act of creation, and not by virtue of his government or conservation of the universe. It surpasses all other dominion because God stands in no need of service, because it is sure and irremovable, and because it meets with universal service.
As yet we are in the midst of scholastic definitions and distinctions; but Wycliffe soon finds occasion to state what may be called the fundamental principle of his theory. God, he says, rules not mediately through the rule of subject vassals, as other kings hold dominion, since immediately and of himself he makes, sustains, and governs all that which he possesses, and helps it to perform its work according to other uses which he requires. There is a feudalism here, but a feudalism in which there are no mesne lords; all men hold directly of God, with differences no doubt in accidentals, but in the main fact of their
- ↑ Dominium est habitudo nature racionalis secundum quam denominatur suo prefici servienti: cap. 1 f. 1 d; also in the De civili dominio i. 9 f. 20 d. Locke was very merry at sir Robert Filmer's expense for his having used the phrase 'in habit and not in act' of Adam's position as governor before there was any one to govern: 'A very pretty way,' he says, 'of being a governor, without government, a father, without children, and a king, without subjects... Adam, as soon as he was created, had a title only in habit and not in act, which, in plain English, is, he had actually no title at all.' See the first Treatise on Government iii. 18. Still Filmer's distinction is perfectly legitimate, and I only quote Locke's words in order to shew that we have to accept a certain logical terminology before we can pretend to criticise a scholastic position such as Filmer's or Wycliffe's.
idem sequitur quod potestas non sit genus dominii: nam dominium dependet a possesso serviente vel suo principaliter [cod. 1294: al. principium] terminante; sed nulla potestas sic dependet, ergo nullum dominium est potestas: De dominio divino i. 2 f. 3 b; cf. cap. 1 f. 2 b.
