might take the form, as we have seen hitherto, of their claiming powers which really belong to God. It was none the less superstition to postulate the intervention of Clod in cases where human judgement alone was necessary. For men to disregard the evidence of ascertained facts,[1] and to call for perpetual miracles at their behest (Lib. de divinis sententiis digest. contra damnabilem opinionem putantium divini iudicii veritatem igni vel aquis vel conflictu armorum patefieri, ii. p. 301 E.) was impiety of the worst kind, making God in fact the servant of man. It is this argument, supported by copious citations from the Scriptures, that Agobard alleges against the popular customs of ordeal by fire or water and of wager of battle. Of the two usages the ordeal was discouraged (Capit. Wormat., a. 829, Pertz, legg. I. 352 § 12.) and prohibited by the emperor;[2] and Agobard may have deemed it unworthy of serious argument. He applies his forces mainly to the exposure of the wrong - nex, not lex, (Lib. adv. leg. Gund. xi. p. 266 C.) - involved in the test of combat. The ordeal indeed was destitute of any feature except the superstitious, while combat, as Hallam observes (Middle ages, 3. 294, ed. 1872.), might be held to be partly redeemed by 'the natural dictates of resentment in a brave man unjustly accused, and the sympathy of a warlike people with the display of skill and intrepidity.' At Lyons, the old Burgundian capital, the 'wager of battle,' resting as it did on a law of the Burgundian king Gundobad, is thought to have been resorted to (Gfrörer 3. 751.) with peculiar frequency. (Lib. adv. leg. Gundob. vii. p. 265 C.) Agobard addressed one of his two treatises on the subject to the emperor and implored him to suppress the evil. (De div. sent. v. p. 302 B.) He urged not only the religious objections,
- ↑ Utilitas iudiciorum constat in discussione causarum et subtilitate investigationum: Lib. adv. legem Gundobadi et impia certamina quae per eam geruntur, x. p. 265 H.
- ↑ It is significant that so representative a churchman as archbishop Hincmar of Rheims opposed this ordinance: Noorden, Hinkmar 173. Gottschalk also challenged the ordeal as a test of the truth of his opinions: ibid. p. 67.
fact nowhere expresses himself without qualification, either on this head or on that of the devil's actual interference in human affairs. The words with which he closes the story given in the text, offering it as an example 'de inani seductione et vera sensus diminutione' (p. 275 B), shew how closely connected in his mind the two ideas were. It is uncritical to link a number of detached phrases or epithets, chosen from different places, and to take credit for realising, when one is only confusing, an author's system.
