its sense is infinite, because it is the reflexion of the divine
reason; but reason stands above it, is man's sure guide
in interpreting the written message of revelation. If
the authority be true, neither can contradict the other,
since both proceed from the same source, namely from
the divine wisdom. To appreciate this position we must
remember that its object was in no wise to lower the
dignity of the Bible, but solely to elevate the conception of the human understanding. Nor was it a new or unheard-of thing. Fredegisus, Alcuin s scholar at York and his successor in the abbacy of Saint Martin at Tours, had made a very similar statement of the relation of reason to authority, and he had felt it compatible with the most literal view of inspiration.[1] Neither he nor the Scot had any doubt of the irrefragable truth of the Bible.
But while Fredegisus found it in the literal sense, John sought for the larger meaning concealed within its depths. For the sense of the divine utterances is manifold and infinite, even as in one and the same feather of the peacock we behold a marvellous and beautiful variety of countless colours. Like principles, as one applied them, might lead to a submissive dependence on the letter, or to amplest freedom of rational enquiry. For in the one writer, reason without the support of authority is weak, in the other it stands firm fortified by its own virtues, and needs not to be strengthened by any prop of authority.
If we examine more closely the Scot's view of reason it appears that authority is actually related to it as a I species to its genus. In both God reveals not himself but the forms in which we can conceive him. The human reason is the dwelling-place of the word of God. This manifestation, this theophany (John’s technical name for God's revelation to man), is coextensive with the reign of reason and therefore, since reason is every-
- ↑ See above pp. 40 sq. The correspondence is plain if we accept the emendation of the place in Eredegisus proposed by Dr Reuter, Geschichte der religiosen Aufkliirung im Mittelalter 1. 274 n. 21: primum ratione, in quantum hominis ratio patitur, dcinde auctoritate, non qualibet sed rational! (edit, ratione) duntaxat.
