Thus they always presuppose in man a reason by which he is able to guide himself aright. 7. From this method of teaching we are forced somewhat to dissent. For philosophers, being unacquainted with the corruption of nature, which is the punishment of revolt, erroneously confound two states of man which are very different from each other. Let us therefore hold, for the pur pose of the present work, that the soul consists of two parts, the intellect and the will, (Book II. chap. ii. sec. 2, 12,) — the office of the intellect being to distinguish between objects, according as they seem deserving of being approved or disapproved ; and the office of the will, to choose and follow what the intellect declares to be good, to reject and shun what it declares to be bad, (Plato, in Phasdro.) We dwell not on the subtlety of Aristotle, that the mind has no motion of itself; but that the moving power is choice, which he also terms the appetive intellect. Not to lose ourselves in superfluous questions, let it be enough to know that the intellect is to us, as it were, the guide and ruler of the soul ; that the will always follows its beck, and waits for its decision, in matters of desire. For which reason Aristotle truly taught, that in the appetite there is a pursuit and rejection corresponding in some degree to affirmation and negation in the intellect, (Aristot. Ethic, lib. vi. c. 2.) Moreover, it will be seen in another place, (Book II. c. ii. sec. 1226,) how surely the intellect governs the will. Here we only wish to observe, that the soul does not possess any faculty which may not be duly referred to one or other of these members. And in this way we com prehend sense under intellect. Others distinguish thus : They say that sense inclines to pleasure in the same way as the intellect to good ; that hence the appetite of sense becomes concupiscence and lust, while the aifection of the intellect becomes will. For the term appetite, which they prefer, I use that of will, as being more common. . Therefore, God has provided the soul of man with intellect, by which he might discern good from evil, just from unjust, and might know what to follow or to shun, reason going before with her lamp ; whence philosophers, in
