SECRET NOFORN
U
(15) (S) Pk of on board defensive missile systems diminishes inside 10 NM. (Rogers, pp. 838-839).
U
(16) (S) Visual identification of the aircraft was not feasible. (Rogers, p. 839).
U
c. (S) recalled the following additional indicators which he use in assessing the threat posed by TN 4131.
U
(1) (S) The aircraft had lifted off from a military airfield in Iran heading south. ( , p. 812).
U
(2) (S) The aircraft appeared to veer toward USS MONTGOMERY after CAPT Rogers ordered that the target be illuminated. ( , p. 814).
U
(3) (S) The aircraft's lift off from Bandar Abbas was observed to be in a pattern that did not match previous COMAIR flights. ( , p. 812).
U
(4) (S) Track 4131 was reported as an F-14. ( , p. 812).
U
(5) (S) SSES provides no information to negate the reported assertion that track 4131 was an F-14. ( , p. 813).
U
(6) (S) P-3 turned inbound and was tracking in the classic targeting profile. ( p. 814).
U
d. (S) CJTFME considered the following indicators under the ROE when concurring in USS VINCENNES decision to engage track 4131:
U
(1) (S) The aircraft had been identified by USS VINCENNES as an F-14.
U
(2) (S) USS VINCENNES indicated that the aircraft was inbound on USS VINCENNES.
U
(3) (S) USS VINCENNES was told to warn the aircraft. ( p. 426; p.886).
D.POST ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITY
1.Search and Rescue
U
a. (SNF) The IRGC boats which were involved in the gun fight with VINCENNES/MONTGOMERY departed the area toward the wreckage in the very early 0700Z hour. (IO 232, recap of events)
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SECRET NOFORN
