SECRET NOFORN
18.(U) The warnings issued by USS VINCENNES over IAD and MAD nets were transmitted and were heard by other units. However, it is impossible to know whether a particular aircraft has heard a challenge unless it replies or turns away.
F.COMMERCIAL AIR
1.(U) Commercial air, particularly commercial air from Iran, is at risk in the Persian Gulf as long as hostilities continue in the area. Unless an aircraft can be visually identified as a non-threat, any aircraft approaching a U.S. Navy ship could be considered a threat. However, an aircraft at high altitude (above 25,000 ft) will likely not be evaluated as a threat.
U
2.(C) U.S. Navy units operating in the Persian Gulf have insufficient current information on commercial traffic schedules, on commercial air routes, and on the type and ranges of IFF codes used by commercial traffic. With over 1,000 commercial flights per week within the Persian Gulf area, it would be difficult for individual ships to maintain current, accurate airline information.
3.(U) Due to heavy pilot workload during take-off and climb-out, and the requirement to communicate with both Approach Control and Tehran Center, the pilot of Iran Air Flight 655 probably was not monitoring IAD.
4.(U) Any aircraft, including commercial aircraft, could be used in a suicide mission role, therefore, Commanders cannot disregard an aircraft squawking Mode III, IFF, flying on a commercial air corridor, and on a CBDR to his ship.
5.(U) Current verbal warnings and challenges used by JTFME units are ambiguous because they do not clearly identify to pilots exactly which aircraft the ship is attempting to contact.
6.(U) The limited number of VHF radios on U.S. surface units degrades their ability to simultaneously monitor the IAD frequency and communicate with civilian air traffic control agencies.
7.(U) Bandar Abbas Tower, Approach Control and Tehran Center did not hear, or failed to relay, the IAD warnings issued by USS VINCENNES to IR 655.
U
8.(C) The current tools used by the U.S. Navy for differentiating between friendly and hostile unknown aircraft were designed primarily for the open ocean environment. U.S. Naval weapon systems can reach further and often react more quickly than sensors can evaluate. This is especially true
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SECRET NOFORN
