Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/9

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  1. necessarily to suggest culpability.
    (U) There were, of course, a number of areas of VINCENNES CIC performance that deserve some attention. The investigation examined the ship's training and battle organization. It went on to recommend that the AAWC position in the CIC organization be strengthened and that the "GW" not be given responsibility as a radio telephone talker. In my view, when operating in an environment that includes commercial airlines the process of "target designation" should be formalized. Also circuit discipline becomes extremely important and VINCENNES should work to improve in this area. Clearly, the GW or AAWC should confirm or disaffirm important reports (such as descending altitude)--particularly ones that change conditions just as the Captain is approaching the firing point. The Commanding Officer and the administrative chain of command should review the investigation with these points in mind with the intention of translating this tragic incident into meaningful corrective actions.
  2. (U) It is my view that, understanding the entire context, reasonable minds will conclude that the Commanding Officer did what his nation expected of him in the defense of his ship and crew. This regrettable accident, a by-product of the Iran-Iraq war, was not the result of culpable conduct onboard VINCENNES.
  3. (U)  
  4. (U) As to the AEGIS system itself, it performed as designed and subsequent analysis indicated that the sensor data collected was accurate. This was one of our first experiences with the AEGIS under battle conditions and the Investigating Officer made a few suggestions as to refinements to be explored.
    (U) It should be appreciated that AEGIS was never advertised as being capable of identifying the type of aircraft being tracked. That decision is still a matter for human judgment; despite AEGIS' considerable capabilities. AEGIS' major advantages are the extended range of its sensors, its fast reaction time, the capacity to track many targets at once, its ability to send this information automatically to other units, and its data displays which combine sensor information with other inputs and better convey it to the users. Because of its long range radar it gives operators additional time to react, to gather data, and to make considered judgments. Operating close-in to a land-based airfield, however, these advantages can be severely eroded. That problem is not the

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