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f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed to selected.
g. Mr. Harrin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected overnight.
[[h. General Carter urged that, in connection with [ ] General Lanndale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities.]] Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban countermeasures which had been outlines by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail.
i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in wrecking the Cuban economy.
PERTINENT background
4. [[The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32 . General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of
