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Nationalism, Militarism, and War
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an extraordinary memorial recommending a policy of conquest and empire in East Asia. The authenticity of this particular document is definitely open to question, but there can be no doubt that such views as it expressed were advanced by some government officials during the 1920’s. These men had tried, however, to win acceptance of their program by normal political procedures, and they had usually been overruled by the business men.

The turning point between the liberal 1920’s and the reactionary 1930’s came in 1931, when certain military forces, without the approval of the civil government and possibly even without the specific approval of higher military authorities, started their own war of territorial aggrandizement. In September, Japanese Army units stationed in Manchuria to protect the great South Manchurian Railway and other Japanese interests, embarked upon the conquest of all Manchuria on the flimsy pretext that Chinese troops had tried to blow up the railway. Within a few months, Manchuria had been overrun by Japanese forces, and troops had been landed at Shanghai in central China. After a very sanguinary fight, they seized the Chinese portions of this key city and some surrounding territory. Early in 1932, Manchuria became a puppet state called Manchukuo. The League of Nations and the United States looked with strong disfavor on this outburst of military aggression in the Far East. But since neither did more than censure Japan verbally and withhold recognition of Manchukuo, Japan found their policies all bark and no bite. Her answer to their criticism was simply to withdraw from the League of Nations.