Jump to content

Page:Japan (Reischauer).pdf/189

From Wikisource
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
Nationalism, Militarism, and War
[ 173

a negative control over any Cabinet or candidate for the Premiership. Army and navy ministers were chosen from the list of active generals and admirals, and the armed forces could thus make a Cabinet fall or prevent a newly appointed Premier from forming a Cabinet by refusing to let any general or admiral serve in these key posts. The use of this veto power at certain crucial points in the 1930’s aided the militarists greatly in their attempts to gain control of the government.

An even more decisive factor was that direct action on the part of the army or of individual extremists always resulted in an increase in the influence of the militarists. The general public, reverting to the feudal tradition of rule by military men, accepted the claims of military extremists at their face value and judged these men to be “sincere,” while accusing their opponents of “insincerity” as scheming politicians and selfish capitalists.

The fight was not only between the armed forces and the civil government. Much of the struggle for power between extremists and moderates took place within the army itself. In 1935, a lieutenant colonel, representing the younger officer faction, murdered one of the leading generals of the War Ministry, because he was thought to be carrying out a sweeping program of reassignment of high officers in an attempt to rob the extremists of influence.

In the general election of February 1936, the voting public definitely endorsed the more liberal candidates, indicating very strong support still for parliamentary government. Military extremists, startled by the recalcitrant attitude of the public, struck swiftly.