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Nationalism, Militarism, and War
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eventually stopped; Japanese assets abroad were frozen; and with the cooperation of the British and the Dutch, shipments of oil were cut off. Imports of scrap iron and oil were vital to the Japanese economy and war machine.

By the summer of 1941, Japan was confronted with a most difficult and momentous decision. Four years of war in China had strained her economy, and the tightening blockade imposed by the Western democracies would, if permitted to continue long enough, seriously impair Japanese economic strength and greatly reduce her military effectiveness. The Chinese war would become increasingly difficult to wage, and Japan would eventually lose her military supremacy in the Far East. Obviously the policy of waiting for China to collapse was no longer feasible, and action was called for.

Two choices were open to Japan. One was to withdraw her forces from China, as the United States demanded, and be content with whatever economic concessions the Western democracies would make. The other was to break the economic blockade by war on the Western democracies. The moderates, appalled by the danger of war against a coalition of foreign powers but aware that the army would never be willing to withdraw empty-handed from China, desperately sought some compromise which would satisfy both the United States and the militarists at home. The United States, however, refused to compromise with aggression.

As the year 1941 wore on, it became obvious that war was inevitable. Although the activities of certain extremists in the past had threatened to embroil Japan in