economic and military empire, containing enormous natural resources and many hundreds of millions of industrious people, protected from attack by the vast expanse of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
It was a fateful decision. As the result of small initial wagers in 1931 and in 1937, Japan was now forced into a position in which she either had to withdraw ignominiously from the game and lose what was already won, or else make a win-all, lose-all play. In Tokyo in the autumn of 1941, the chances for success seemed good, and the rewards of victory promised to be the creation of the most populous and perhaps the richest empire the world had ever seen.
But again the Japanese miscalculated, not so much on geographic, economic, or military as on human factors. They counted heavily on their own moral superiority, the famed “Japanese spirit,” and the supposed degeneracy and pacifism of the Western democracies, particularly America, which they believed to be corrupted by too many luxuries. They were convinced that Americans did not have the will to fight a long and costly war. In this delusion the Japanese showed themselves to be so blinded by their own nationalistic and militaristic propaganda that they were unable to evaluate the spirit of other peoples or to judge their reactions correctly. They entirely misread the character not only of the Americans, but of the British and Russian peoples too. The Russians did not collapse; the British continued a valiant struggle with growing determination and strength; and the Americans entered the war with a resolution and vigor the Japanese had not dreamed possible.
